The Muslim Brotherhood's Conquest of Europe
by Lorenzo Vidino
Since its founding in 1928, the Muslim
Brotherhood (Hizb al-Ikhwan
al-Muslimun) has profoundly influenced the
political life of the Middle East. Its motto
is telling: "Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Qur'an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of
Allah is our highest hope."
While the Brotherhood's radical ideas have
shaped the beliefs of generations of Islamists, over the past two decades, it
has lost some of its power and appeal in the Middle East,
crushed by harsh repression from local regimes and snubbed by the younger
generations of Islamists who often prefer more radical organizations.
But the Middle East
is only one part of the Muslim world. Europe
has become an incubator for Islamist thought and political development. Since
the early 1960s, Muslim Brotherhood members and sympathizers have moved to Europe and slowly but steadily established a wide and
well-organized network of mosques, charities, and Islamic organizations. Unlike
the larger Islamic community, the Muslim Brotherhood's ultimate goal may not be
simply "to help Muslims be the best citizens they can be," but rather
to extend Islamic law throughout Europe and the United States.
Four decades of teaching and cultivation
have paid off. The student refugees who migrated from the Middle East forty
years ago and their descendants now lead organizations that represent the local
Muslim communities in their engagement with Europe's
political elite. Funded by generous contributors from the Persian
Gulf, they preside over a centralized network that spans nearly
every European country.
These organizations represent themselves as
mainstream, even as they continue to embrace the Brotherhood's radical views
and maintain links to terrorists. With moderate rhetoric and well-spoken
German, Dutch, and French, they have gained acceptance among European
governments and media alike. Politicians across the political spectrum rush to
engage them whenever an issue involving Muslims arises or, more parochially,
when they seek the vote of the burgeoning Muslim community.
But, speaking Arabic or Turkish before
their fellows Muslims, they drop their facade and embrace radicalism. While
their representatives speak about interfaith dialogue and integration on
television, their mosques preach hate and warn worshippers about the evils of
Western society. While they publicly condemn the murder of commuters in Madrid and school children in Russia, they continue to raise
money for Hamas and other terrorist organizations.
Europeans, eager to create a dialogue with their increasingly disaffected
Muslim minority, overlook this duplicity. The case is particularly visible in Germany, which retains a place of key importance
in Europe, not only because of its location at the heart of Europe,
but also because it played host to the first major wave of Muslim Brotherhood
immigrants and is host to the best-organized Brotherhood presence. The German
government's reaction is also instructive if only to show the dangers of
accepting Muslim Brotherhood rhetoric at face value, without looking at the
broader scope of its activities.
The Muslim Brotherhood
The situation in Germany is
particularly telling. More than anywhere else in Europe, the Muslim Brotherhood
has gained significant power and political acceptance. Islamist organizations
in other European countries now consciously follow the model pioneered by their
During the 1950s and 1960s, thousands of
Muslim students left the Middle East to study
at German universities, drawn not only by the German institutions' technical
reputations but also by a desire to escape repressive regimes. Egyptian ruler Gamal Abdel Nasser's regime was
especially vigorous in its attempts to root out the Islamist opposition.
Beginning in 1954, several members of the Muslim Brotherhood fled Egypt to escape
arrest or assassination. West
Germany provided a welcome refuge. Bonn's motivations were
not simply altruistic. As terrorism expert Khalid Durán explained in his
studies on jihadism in Europe,
the West German government had decided to cut diplomatic relations with
countries that recognized East
Germany. When Egypt
and Syria established
diplomatic relations with the communist government, Bonn decided to welcome Syrian and Egyptian
political refugees. Often, these dissidents were Islamists. Many members of the
Muslim Brotherhood were already familiar with Germany. Several had cooperated
with the Nazis before and during World War II.
Some had even, reportedly, fought in the infamous Bosnian Handschar
division of the Schutzstaffel (SS).
One of the Muslim Brotherhood's first
pioneers in Germany
was Sa‘id Ramadan, the
personal secretary of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan
Ramadan, an Egyptian who had led the Muslim Brotherhood's irregulars in Palestine in 1948,
moved to Geneva in 1958 and attended law school
In Germany, he founded what
has become one of Germany's
three main Muslim organizations, the Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland (Islamic Society of Germany, IGD),
over which he presided from 1958 to 1968.
Ramadan also cofounded the Muslim World League,
a well-funded organization that the Saudi establishment uses to spread its
radical interpretation of Islam throughout the world. The U.S. government
closely monitors the activities of the Muslim World League, which it accuses of
financing terrorism. In March 2002, a U.S. Treasury Department-led task force
raided the group's Northern Virginia offices
looking for documents tying the group to Al-Qaeda, Hamas,
and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In January 2004, the Senate Finance Committee
asked the Internal Revenue Service for its records on the Muslim World League
"as part of an investigation into possible links between nongovernmental
organizations and terrorist financing networks."
This privileged relationship with the oil-rich kingdom granted Ramadan an
influx of money, which he used to fund the powerful Islamic Center of Geneva
and to bankroll several financial and religious activities. Hani
Ramadan, Sa‘id's son,
currently runs the Islamic Center. Among its other board members is Sa‘id's other son, Tariq Ramadan,
who recently made headlines in the United States when the Department of
Homeland Security revoked his visa to teach at Notre Dame University. Sa‘id
Ramadan's case is not isolated.
Following Ramadan's ten-year presidency of
the IGD, Pakistani national Fazal Yazdani
briefly led the IGD before Ghaleb Himmat,
a Syrian with Italian citizenship, took the helm. During his long stewardship
(1973-2002), Himmat shuttled between Italy, Austria,
Germany, Switzerland and the United States.
Intelligence agencies around the world have long scrutinized Himmat's terrorist connections. He is one of the founders
of the Bank al-Taqwa, a powerful conglomerate dubbed
by Italian intelligence, "Bank of the Muslim Brotherhood," which has
financed terrorist groups since the mid-1990s if not earlier.
Himmat helped Youssef Nada,
one of the Muslim Brotherhood's financial masterminds, run Al-Taqwa and a web of companies headquartered in locations
such as Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and the Bahamas, which
maintain few regulations on monetary origin or destination. Both Himmat and Nada reportedly funneled large sums to groups
such as Hamas and the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front
and set up a secret credit line for a top associate of Osama bin Laden.
In November 2001, the U.S. Treasury
Department designated both Himmat and Nada as
According to Italian intelligence, the Al-Taqwa
network also financed several Islamic centers throughout Europe
and many Islamist publications, including Risalatul
the official magazine of the Muslim Brotherhood. After the U.S. Treasury
Department designation, Himmat resigned from the IGD's presidency. His successor was Ibrahim
el-Zayat, a 36-year-old of Egyptian descent and the
charismatic leader of numerous student organizations.
The fact that IGD leaders Ramadan and Himmat are among the most prominent Muslim Brotherhood
members of the last half-century suggests the links between the IGD and the Ikhwan. Moreover, reports issued by internal intelligence
agencies from various German states openly call the IGD an offshoot of the
In particular, according to one intelligence report, the Egyptian branch of the
Muslim Brotherhood has dominated the IGD since its early days.
The Muslim Brotherhood—led by Ramadan and Himmat—sponsored
the construction of the imposing Islamic Center of Munich in 1960,
aided by large donations from Middle Eastern rulers such as King Fahd of Saudi Arabia who, according to a 1967 Sueddeutsche Zeitung
article, donated 80,000 marks.
The Ministry of Interior of Nordrhein-Westfalen
states that the Islamic Center of Munich has been one of the European
headquarters for the Brotherhood since its foundation.
The center publishes a magazine, Al-Islam, whose efforts (according to
an Italian intelligence dossier),
are financed by the Bank al-Taqwa. According to the
interior minister of Baden-Württemberg, Al-Islam shows explicitly how
the German Brothers reject the concept of a secular state.
Its February 2002 issue, for example, states,
In the long run, Muslims cannot be
satisfied with the acceptance of German family, estate, and trial law. …
Muslims should aim at an agreement between the Muslims and the German state
with the goal of a separate jurisdiction for Muslims.
The IGD, of which the Islamic Center of
Munich is one of the most important members, represents the main offshoot of
the Egyptian Brotherhood in Germany.
But the IGD is also the quintessential example of how the Muslim Brotherhood
has gained power in Europe. The IGD has grown
significantly over the years, and it now incorporates dozens of Islamic
organizations throughout the country. Islamic centers from more than thirty
German cities have joined its umbrella.
Today, the IGD's real strength lies in its
cooperation with and sponsorship of many Islamic youth and student
organizations across Germany.
This focus on youth organizations came
after Zayat's succession. He understood the
importance of focusing on the next generation of German Muslims and launched
recruitment drives to get young Muslims involved in Islamic organizations. But
a Meckenheim police report on the sharply dressed Zayat also reveals alarming connections. German authorities
openly say he is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. They also link him to the
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), a Saudi nongovernmental organization
that seeks to spread Wahhabism, the radical and
intolerant Saudi interpretation of Islam, throughout the world with its
literature and schools.
WAMY, which falls under the umbrella of the Muslim World League, has the
stated goal of "arming the Muslim youth with full confidence in the
supremacy of the Islamic system over other systems." It is the largest
Muslim youth organization in the world and can boast unparalleled resources.
In 1991 WAMY published a book called Tawjihat
Islamiya (Islamic Views) that stated,
"Teach our children to love taking revenge on the Jews and the oppressors,
and teach them that our youngsters will liberate Palestine
and Al-Quds [Jerusalem]
when they go back to Islam and make jihad for the sake of Allah."
The sentiments in Tawjihat Islamiya are the rule rather than the exception. Many
other WAMY publications are filled with strong anti-Semitic and anti-Christian
Meckenheim police also link Zayat
to Institut Européen des
Sciences Humaines, a French school that prepares
European imams. Several radical clerics lecture at the school and several
European intelligence agencies accuse the school of spreading religious hatred.
German authorities also highlight the fact that he is involved in several money
Zayat has never been indicted for terrorist activity,
but he has dubious financial dealings and maintains associations with many
organizations that spread religious hatred. The IGD may have changed leadership
after the U.S. Treasury's designation of Himmat, but
it did not change direction.
While the Egyptian branch of the Muslim
Brotherhood has chosen Munich as its base of
operations in Germany, its
Syrian branch is headquartered in Aachen, a German town near the
Dutch border. The former Carolingian capital, with its famous university, is
now home to a large Muslim population including the prominent Syrian Al-Attar
family. The first Attar to move to Aachen was Issam,
who fled persecution in his native country in the 1950s when he was leader of
the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Other members of the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood soon followed. With time, Islamists from other countries adopted
Attar's Bilal mosque in Aachen as their
base of operations.
From hosting exiled Algerian terrorists
to operating a charity designated by the U.S. Department of Treasury as a
financial front for Hamas,
Aachen is well known to intelligence agencies
throughout the world.
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood base in Aachen
kept close relations with their Egyptian counterparts. For example, confirming
the tendency of important Muslim Brotherhood families to close alliance through
intermarriage, Issam al-Attar's son married the daughter
of Al-Taqwa banker Youssef
Links between the two Muslim Brotherhood branches are more extensive than a
single marriage, however. The Aachen Islamic Center
reportedly received funding from Al-Taqwa.
Staff members have rotated between the Islamic Centers in Aachen and Munich. For example, Ahmed von Denffer, editor of the Islamic Center of Munich's Al-Islam
magazine, came to Munich from Aachen.
Nevertheless, some distance remains. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has never
joined the IGD, instead preferring to keep some form of independence.
Of all of Zayat's
financial activities, the one that has attracted the German authorities'
greatest suspicion has been his association with officials of Milli Görüş (National
Vision, in Turkish). Milli Görüş,
which has 30,000 members and perhaps another 100,000 sympathizers,
claims to defend the rights of Germany's
immigrant Turkish population, giving them a voice in the democratic political
arena while "preserving their Islamic identity."
But Milli Görüş has
another agenda. While publicly declaring its interest in democratic debate and
a willingness to see Turkish immigrants integrated into European societies,
some Milli Görüş
leaders have expressed contempt for democracy and Western values. The Bundesverfassungsschutz, Germany's domestic intelligence
agency, has repeatedly warned about Milli Görüş' activities, describing the group in its annual
reports as a "foreign extremist organization."
The agency also reported that "although Milli Görüş, in public statements, pretends to adhere to the
basic principles of Western democracies, abolition of the laicist
government system in Turkey and the establishment of an Islamic state and
social system are, as before, among its goals."
history alone indicates why the group should be considered radical. Former
Turkish prime minister Nehmettin Erbakan,
whose Refah Party was banned by the Turkish
Constitutional Court in January of 1998 for "activities against the
country's secular regime,"
is still Milli Görüş'
undisputed leader, even if his nephew Mehmet Sabri Erbakan is its president.
The 2002 European Milli Görüş
meeting held in the Dutch city of Arnhem, where Nehmettin Erbakan was the keynote
speaker, provides a glimpse into Milli Görüş' ideology. After a tirade against the evils of
integration in the West and U.S.
policies, Erbakan declared that "after the fall
of the wall, the West has found an enemy in Islam."
A Bundesverfassungsschutz report reveals Milli Görüş' real aims:
While in recent times, the Milli Görüş has increasingly
emphasized the readiness of its members to be integrated into German society
and asserts its adherence to the basic law, such statements stem from tactical
calculation rather than from any inner change of the organization.
pushes an agenda similar to that of the IGD, even if its target is more
limited. Nevertheless, both Milli Görüş
and the IGD collaborate on many initiatives. There is also a family connection.
Zayat married Sabiha Erbakan, the sister of Mehmet Sabri Erbakan.
The siblings' mother is also involved in politics and runs an important Islamic
women's organization in Germany.
The Zayat family is active as well. Ibrahim el-Zayat's father is the
imam of the Marburg
mosque; other members of his family are involved in Islamic organizations. As Udo Ulfkotte, a political science
professor specializing in counterespionage at the University
and an expert on Islamic terrorism, notes, the Erbakans
and the Zayats lead networks of organizations that
aim at the radicalization, respectively, of the Turkish and Arab communities in
IGD and Milli Görüş are active in their efforts to increase
political influence and become the official representatives of the entire
German Muslim community. With well-endowed budgets, their mosques provide
social services, organize conferences, and distribute literature nationwide. As
the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Landesverfassungsschutz)
The threat of Islamism for Germany is
posed … primarily by Milli Görüş
and other affiliated groups. They try to spread Islamist views within the
boundaries of the law. Then they try to implement … for all Muslims in Germany a strict interpretation of the Qur'an and of the Shari‘a. … Their public support of tolerance and religious
freedom should be treated with caution.
It presents a problem that politicians and
security services in Germany
view the IGD and Milli Görüş
so differently. But, as Ulfkotte wrote about Zayat in his book, Der Krieg in unseren Staedten (The War in Our Streets),
"politicians of all colors and parties try to reach out to him."
For example, the prestigious Berlin
invited Zayat to represent the Muslim point of view
in an inter-religious meeting organized by the academy in October 2002.
German politicians and Christian institutions regularly partner themselves with
Milli Görüş in various
initiatives. Milli Gazete,
the official journal of Milli Görüş,
once stated that "Milli Görüş
is a shield protecting our fellow citizens from assimilation into barbaric Europe."
Nevertheless, German politicians meet regularly with Milli
Görüş officials to discuss immigration and
integration issues. The fact that an official like Ahmed al-Khalifah,
IGD secretary general, represents Islam before members of parliament who are
discussing religious tolerance,
shows the success of Brotherhood-linked organizations' efforts to gain
acceptance as the representatives of German Muslims. The Office for the
Protection of the Constitution well described these efforts, saying that Milli Görüş (and the IGD)
"strives to dominate regional or nationwide federations and umbrella
organizations for Muslims which are increasingly gaining importance as
interlocutors for state and ecclesiastical authorities and thus to expand its
influence within society."
Zentralrat, the Islamist Umbrella
In 1989, under the auspices of Abdullah
at-Turki, powerful dean of Bin
Saud University in Riyadh,
the Saudis created the Islamische Konzil
Deutschland (Islamic Council of Germany). Turki
assumed the presidency with other top positions held by Ibrahim
el-Zayat, Hasan Özdögan, a high-ranking Milli Görüş official, and
Ahmad Khalifa, an officer from the Islamic Center of
While an official German parliament report describes the Islamische
Konzil as just "another Sunni
organization," such an assumption indicates a dangerous misunderstanding
of the Saudi relationship to German Islamists.
The trend toward consolidation took a step
forward in 1994 when German Islamists realized that a united coalition
translated into greater political relevance and influence. Nineteen
organizations, including the IGD, the Islamic Center of Munich, and the Islamic
Center of Aachen, created an umbrella organization,
the Zentralrat der Muslime. According to a senior German intelligence
official, at least nine out of these nineteen organizations belong to the
The German press has recently investigated the Zentralrat
president, Nadeem Elyas, a
German-educated Saudi physician and an official of the Islamic Center of Aachen. Die Welt linked Elyas
to Christian Ganczarski, an Al-Qaeda operative
currently jailed as one of the masterminds of the 2002 attack on a synagogue in
Ganczarski, a German of Polish descent who converted
to Islam, told authorities that Al-Qaeda recruited him at the Islamic
University of Medina where Elyas sent him to study.
Elyas said he could not remember meeting him but did
not deny the possibility that Ganczarski, who never
completed high school, might have been one of the many individuals he had sent
over the years to radical schools in Saudi Arabia.
Saudi donors paid all of Ganczarski's expenses.
Ganczarski was not alone. Elyas
admitted to having sent hundreds of German Muslims to study at one of the most
radical universities in Saudi
which portrays itself as the umbrella organization for German Muslim
organizations, has become, together with the IGD and Milli
Görüş, the de facto representative of three
million German Muslims. Even though the IGD is a member of the Zentralrat, the two organizations often operate
independently. Their apparent independence is planned. With many organizations
operating under different names, the Muslim Brotherhood fools German
politicians who believe they are consulting a spectrum of opinion.
The media seek the Zentralrat's officials when they
want the Muslim view on everything from the debate about the admissibility of
the hijab (headscarf) in public schools, to
the war in Iraq,
and so forth. Politicians seek the Zentralrat's
endorsement when they want to reach out to the Muslim community. Many German
politicians are uninformed about Islam and do not understand that the view and
the interpretation of Islam that the Zentralrat
expresses, as does the IGD and Milli Görüş, is that of the Muslim Brotherhood and not that
of traditional Islam. Accordingly, the Zentralrat
expresses total opposition to any ban of the hijab,
supports Wahhabi-influenced Islamic education in
schools, and endorses a radical position on the Middle
While many Muslims endorse these views, the problem is that the Zentralrat neither represents nor tolerates those with
divergent views. Moderate German Muslim groups lack the funding and
organization of Muslim Brotherhood-linked groups. In terms of numbers,
influence on the Muslim community, and political relevance, the Zentralrat and its two most important constituent parts,
the IGD and Milli Görüş,
dominate the scene. With ample Saudi financing, the Muslim Brotherhood has
managed to become the voice of the Muslims in Germany.
Recently, the German public was shocked to
hear what is preached inside Saudi-funded mosques and schools. In the fall of
2003, a hidden camera-equipped journalist from Germany's
ARD television infiltrated the Saudi-built
King Fahd Academy
in Bonn and
taped what it taught to young Muslim children. One teacher called for jihad
against the infidels.
While the images elicited a rebuke from German politicians, the rather sterile
debate about Saudi influence on German Muslims has not effected tangible
change. Saudi officials and Saudi-run nongovernmental organizations continue to
groom Muslim Brotherhood organizations.
First Germany, Then Europe
While the Muslim Brotherhood and their
Saudi financiers have worked to cement Islamist influence over Germany's Muslim community, they have not
limited their infiltration to Germany.
Thanks to generous foreign funding, meticulous organization, and the naďveté of
European elites, Muslim Brotherhood-linked organizations have gained prominent
positions throughout Europe. In France, the
extremist Union des Organisations Islamiques
de France (Union of Islamic Organizations of France) has become the predominant
organization in the government's Islamic Council.
In Italy, the extremist Unione delle Comunita'
ed Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia (Union of the Islamic Communities and
Organizations in Italy)
is the government's prime partner in dialogue regarding Italian Islamic issues.
In parallel to European Union integration
efforts, the Muslim Brotherhood is also seeking to integrate its various
European proxies. Over the past fifteen years, the Muslim Brotherhood has
created a series of pan-European organizations such as the Federation of
Islamic Organizations in Europe, in which
representatives from national organizations can meet and plan initiatives.
Perhaps the Muslim Brotherhood's greatest pan-European impact has, as with the Islamische Gemeinschaft
Deutschland, been with its youth organization. In June 1996, Muslim youth
organizations from Sweden, France, and England
joined forces with the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe
and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth to create a European Islamic youth
Three months later, thirty-five delegates from eleven countries met in
Leicester and formally launched the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student
Organizations (FEMYSO), which maintains its headquarters in Brussels.
According to its official publications,
FEMYSO is "a network of 42 national and international organizations bringing
together youth from over 26 different countries." FEMYSO proudly stated in
2003 that over the preceding four years it had become
The de facto voice of
the Muslim youth in Europe. It is regularly consulted on issues
pertaining to Muslims in Europe. It has also
developed useful links with: the European Parliament, the Council of Europe,
the United Nations, the European Youth Forum, and numerous relevant NGOs at the
Ibrahim el-Zayat, who
held the presidency until his commitments in Germany forced him to step down,
even used the FEMYSO perch to address the European Parliament.
Because the Muslim Brotherhood provides the bulk of FEMYSO's
constituent organizations, it provides the "de facto voice of the Muslim
youth in Europe." While FEMYSO claims
that it "is committed to fighting prejudices at all the levels, so that
the future of Europe is a multicultural, inclusive and respectful one,"
such statements ring hollow given the position of sponsors like the World
Assembly of Muslim Youth which believes that "the Jews are enemies of the
faithful, God, and the Angels; the Jews are humanity's enemies. … Every tragedy
that inflicts the Muslims is caused by the Jews."
The Muslim Brotherhood's ample funds and
organization have contributed to their success in Europe.
But their acceptance into mainstream society and their unchallenged rise to
power would not have been possible had European elites been more vigilant,
valued substance over rhetoric, and understood the motivations of those
financing and building these Islamist organizations. Why have Europeans been so
naďve? Bassam Tibi, a
German professor of Syrian descent and an expert on Islam in Europe,
thinks that Europeans—and Germans in particular—fear the accusation of racism.
Radicals in sheep's clothing have learned that they can silence almost
everybody with the accusation of xenophobia. Any criticism of Muslim
Brotherhood-linked organizations is followed by outcries of racism and
anti-Muslim persecution. Journalists who are not frightened by these
appellatives are swamped with baseless and unsuccessful but expensive lawsuits.
In some cases, politicians simply fail to
check the backgrounds of those who claim to be legitimate representatives for
the Muslim community. As in the United
States, self-described representatives for
the Muslim community are far more radical than the populations they represent.
In other cases, politicians realize that these organizations are not the ideal
counterparts in a constructive dialogue but do not take the time to seek other
less visible but more moderate organizations, several of which exist only at
the grassroots level, impeded by financial constraints.
What most European politicians fail to
understand is that by meeting with radical organizations, they empower them and
grant the Muslim Brotherhood legitimacy. There is an implied endorsement to any
meeting, especially when the same politicians ignore moderate voices that do
not have access to generous Saudi funding. This creates a self-perpetuating
cycle of radicalization because the greater the political legitimacy of the
Muslim Brotherhood, the more opportunity it and its proxy groups will have to
influence and radicalize various European Muslim communities. The ultimate
irony is that Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna dreamed of spreading Islamism throughout Egypt and the
Muslim world. He would have never dreamed that his vision might also become a
reality in Europe.
Lorenzo Vidino is deputy director at the Investigative
Project, a Washington D.C.-based counterterrorism research institute.
 "Homepage," Muslim Brotherhood Movement website, accessed Dec. 22, 2004.
Aviv: Stephen Roth Institute, Tel
Sept. 19, 2004; also see Daniel Pipes, The Islamic
States of America?, FrontPageMagazine.com, Sept. 23, 2004.
 Khalid Duran, "Jihadism in Europe," The Journal of Counterterrorism and
Security International, Fall 2000, pp. 12-5.
Richard Labeviere, Dollars for Terror: The U.S. and Islam (New York: Algora
Publishing 2000), p. 141.
Georges Lepre, "Himmler's
Bosnian Division: The Waffen SS Handschar
Division 1943-45," Schiffer Aviation
History, Jan. 2000, pp. 31-4.
 M. H. Faruqi,
"Les Frčres Musulmans. Politique de ‘rabbaniyya,'
les pričres avant le pouvoir Dr. Saďd Ramadan, 1926-1995," Historique du Centre Islamique, Islamic
Center of Geneva.
"Prasidenten der IGD," Islamische
Gemeinschaft in Deutschland website, accessed Dec.
Faruqi, "Les Frčres Musulmans," Historique du Centre Islamique.
"Senators Request Tax Information on Muslim Charities
for Probe," U.S. State Department news release, Jan. 14, 2004.
Fouad Ajami, "Tariq Ramadan," The Wall Street Journal, Sept.
Labeviere, Dollars for Terror, p. 122.
Official dossier on Ahmed Nasreddin (hereafter Nasreddin dossier), Servizio per
le Informazioni e la Sicurezza
Democratica (Italian secret service, SISDE), Apr. 6,
1996, p. 10.
Ibid., p. 24.
Ibid., p. 31.
Newsweek, May 12, 2004.
"Recent OFAC Actions," U.S. Department
of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Nov. 7, 2001.
Nasreddin dossier, p. 31.
"Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland" Innenministerium, Nordrhein-Westfalen
land website, accessed Dec. 22, 2004; "Islamismus," Landesamt
fur Verfassungsschutz, Hessen
website, accessed Dec. 22, 2004.
"Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland," Innenministerium, Nordrhein-Westfalen
Official Guide to the Munich Mosque (Munich: The Islamic Center of Munich), purchased by the
author at the Milli Görüş'
"Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland," Innenministerium, Nordrhein-Westfalen
"Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland," Innenministerium, Nordrhein-Westfalen
Nasreddin dossier, p. 31.
Report on radical Islam, Baden Württenberg state Verfassungsschutzbericht,
2003, p. 48.
"Koordination mit Zentren in folgenden Städten," Islamische Gemeinschaft
in Deutschland website, accessed Dec. 22, 2004.
Report on Ibrahim el-Zayat,
Aug. 27, 2003, p. 3.
 David Kane, FBI senior
special agent, affidavit in "Supplemental Declaration in Support of
Pre-Trial Detention," United States of America v. Soliman
S. Biheiri, U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia. The affidavit also details WAMY's
links to the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas.
Kane, "Supplemental Declaration in Support of Pre-Trial Detention."
The Wall Street Journal, Apr. 15, 2003.
Report on el-Zayat, Aug. 27, 2003, p. 4.
Duran, "Jihadism in Europe,"
Klaus Gruenewald, "Defending
Germany's Constitution," Middle East
Quarterly, Mar. 1995, p. 10.
See Al-Aqsa Foundation, "Recent OFAC Reports," U.S. Department of the Treasury,
Office of Foreign Assets Control, June 6, 2003.
Nasreddin dossier, p. 9.
Ibid., p. 30.
Duran, "Jihadism in Europe,"
"Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Gorus," Innenministerium,
Nordrhein-Westfalen land website, accessed Dec. 22,
Annual report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesverfassungsschutz), 2000, Cologne, p. 174.
Annual report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesverfassungsschutz), 1999, Cologne, p. 165.
Agence France-Presse, Jan.
Mehmet Ülger, "Manifestatie Milli Görüş in Arnhem,"
De Humanist, July 2003.
Annual report, Bundesverfassungsschutz, 2000, p. 198.
Udo Ulfkotte, Der Krieg in unseren Staedten (Frankfurt: Eichborn Publishing,
2003), pp. 32-3.
Author interview with Udo Ulfkotte,
Frankfurt, Feb. 2004.
Within the German federal system, each state has its own Office of the
Protection for the Constitution (Landesverfassungsschutz),
which is independent from the national Bundessverfassungsschutz.
"Islamismus," Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz, Hessen.
Ulfkotte, Der Krieg in unseren Staedten, p. 38.
"Christentum und Islam,"
German Association of Muslim Social Scientists (GMSG), Oct. 26, 2002.
 Anti-Semitism Worldwide 1998/9
Ulfkotte, Der Krieg in unseren Staedten, p. 38.
Annual report, Bundesverfassungsschutz, 2000, p. 174.
Ulfkotte, Der Krieg in unseren Staedten, p. 164.
Ibid., p. 162.
head of the Verfassungsschutz of Nordrhein
Westfahlen, interview on German television SWR, Mar.
Die Welt (Berlin),
May 6, 2003.
Michael Waller, testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland
Security, Oct. 14, 2003.
The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 21, 2003.
Die Welt, May 6, 2003.
Author interview with Ulfkotte, Frankfurt,
Time, Nov. 2, 2003.
Ibid., Apr. 27, 2003.
Renzo Guolo, Xenofobi e Xenofili. Gli Italiani e l'Islam (Bari: Laterza
Publishing, 2003), p. 14.
"The Global Community," MABOnline, Muslim Association of Britain, Dec.
Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations brochure, emailed to
author by a representative of FEMYSO, Jan. 2004.
 "L'Islam en Europe ou L'Islam d'Europe," conference program, European Parliament, Brussels, Dec. 11, 2002.
 FEMYSO brochure.
"Animosity toward the Jews, " A Handy Encyclopedia of Contemporary
Religions and Sects (WAMY), FBI translation from Arabic; Steven Emerson,
statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States, July 9, 2003; Kane, "Supplemental Declaration in Support of
Bassam Tibi, Islamische Zuwanderung,
Die gescheiterte Integration (Munich: DVA, 2002), p. 135.
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